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SALES TAXATION COLLECTION PROBLEMS
PAUL J. HARTMAN.* E. WILLIAM HENRYi" AND GEORGE LANE FOSTER*t
This treatment is designed to gather together a number of legal
problems concerning collection of taxes in the field of sales taxation,
which may confront attorneys who represent either the taxing
authority or the taxpayer. Some of the problems taken up are not
related to each other. They are, nevertheless, troublesome and oft-
times recurring problems. For convenience of discussion, they are
grouped under the two main categories of procedural problems that
arise in sales taxation collections, and the problems of the substantive
liability of various parties for the tax.
PROCEDURAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS1
1. Procedural Due Process as Applied to Tax Collections
While the United States Supreme Court has been strict in its
interpretation of the procedural requirements of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 when applying it to ordinary
judicial proceedings, it has imposed considerably less stringent re-
quirements in the collection and assessment of taxes. In the ordinary
judicial controversy due process requires that the party to be affected
shall have notice and opportunity to be heard at the outset of
the judicial proceedings,3 whereas due process is satisfied in tax
matters by notice and an opportunity for a hearing after a tax has
been assessed. Moreover, a less formal procedure will satisfy the
requirements of due process in tax matters than in ordinary judicial
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
f Student, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
I Student, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. For a discussion of the legal problems in collecting use taxes, see Hartman,
Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, subhead "E. The Use Tax Collecting
Device and the Constitutional Questions," supra.
2. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. For a full discussion of the requirements of procedural due process see
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), which is the leading case on the re-
quirement of notice and opportunity to be heard in the field of ordinary
judicial proceedings. For a more recent case see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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proceedings. The right to notice and hearing may depend upon
the type of tax being collected and the method by which it is to be
determined 4 The general customs employed throughout the country
by tax collecting entities, however, are within the scope of due process
protection.
5
The basis for this distinction between due process strictness in
ordinary judicial proceedings and the less strict due process require-
ments in tax collection matters is found in the legislative aspects of
tax collection,6 the necessity for prompt payment of tax monies in
order to allow the government to continue its functions unhampered
by long delayed suits for collection,7 and the additional fact that a
state is acting in its "sovereign" capacity in the collection of taxes8
The United States Supreme Court has taken the position that the
right to notice and hearing need not be extended to every tax case,
but only to those where a hearing is necessary to determine such
matters as the amount of tax to be assessed, as in the case of a real
property tax which requires an evaluation of the property to be
taxed.9 Moreover, consistent with due process, notice of the taxes
assessed may be transmitted to the taxpayer after the assessment be-
comes final, but before the taxpayer is actually deprived of his
property through the enforcement of a tax "judgment."'0 In cases
where the tax may be computed by a simple formula, no notice or
hearing is required to satisfy the requirements of due process."
Other ready examples of such taxes are poll and license taxes. 2 In
some respects sales taxes based on gross proceeds from sales fall
in this latter category, as the tax statutes simply call for a computation
4. See Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
5. The courts lay great stress upon the fact that for centuries the collection
of taxes has been connected with sovereign power and the customs that have
evolved are to some extent free from the rigid requirements of procedural
due process. See Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
6. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
7. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
8. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
9. See, e.g., Carson v. Brocton Sewerage Comm'n, 182 U.S. 398 (1901),
and compare Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64 (1920) (holding assessment of
real estate tax without notice violates due process and does not fall within the
exception).
10. While this is more fully discussed infra, see, e.g., Lander v. Mercantile
Bank, 186 U.S. 458 (1902).
11. See, e.g., Carson v. Brocton Sewerage Comm'n, 182 U.S. 398 (1901) (tax
imposed for the use of a sewer, the tax was to be computed at an annual rate
of eight dollars for unmetered service or for metered service thirty cents per
1,000 gallons of sewage delivered to the sewer; held: no notice required as
taxpayer can easily compute the tax due under the ordinances fixing the
charges).
12. See, e.g., Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905) (business
license tax; no notice required, if the person carried on the business-selling
cigarettes-the tax followed as a matter of course). See also HELLERSTEIN,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 788, Note E (1952).
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of the tax by the retailer at a certain percentage of his gross sales.13
Frequently, therefore, there is no need for a judicial determination of
the rights of the parties under the initial sales tax levy. However,
the requirement of notice often does become significant where the
sales tax statutes call for a recomputation of the sales tax by the
state tax board14 as to items that have been omitted from the return,15
where the taxpayer has made a mistake in the computation of his
tax as to the final amount due,16 and in cases where the taxpayer has
failed to file a return altogether. 17 Thus in many situations it is ex-
tremely difficult to file a correct return in the first instance. Also,
notice may become important in considering whether certain sales
transactions are exempt from the tax. Thus, a typical sales tax may
reach only "sales at retail." Under such a statute a controversy may
arise as to the exemption of a particular item, whereupon the tax
board might assess a deficiency against the retailer for the additional
amount of tax due on the ground that the retailer improperly gave
an exemption on particular items. 18
13. In reality such a tax is really an income tax based on gross sales, see, e.g.,
the Indiana Gross Income Tax which is "imposed upon the receipt of gross
income, measured by the amount or volume of gross income." IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 64-2601-64-2631 (Burns repl. 1951). A further example of a sales tax so
computed is illustrated by the California Retail Sales Act of 1933 which
provides, "For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail
a tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers at the rate of 2% percent of the
gross receipts of any retailer from the sale of all tangible personal property
sold at retail in this State. . . . CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 6051 (Deering
1952).
14. See, e.g., the California Retail Sales Act, CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE ANN. §
6481 (Deering 1952), which provides, "If the board is not satisfied with the
return or returns of the tax or the amount of tax required to be paid to the
State by any person, it may compute and determine the amount required to
be paid upon the basis of . . . any information within its possession or that
may come into its possession. One or more deficiency determinations may be
made of the amount due for one or for more than one period .... " For similar
statutory provisions note the applicable sections of the sales tax acts listed
in note 18 infra.
15. See, e.g., The Alabama Retail Sales Act, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 763
(Cum. Supp. 1953), which reads in part, "if the amount paid is less than the
amount due, as shown by the return, the department shall immediately notify
the taxpayer of such deficiency and shall add thereto a penalty of ten percent
of the amount due ... ." For comparative legislation see applicable section of
the sales tax acts listed in note 18 infra.
16. See, e.g., Tennessee Sales Tax Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3029 (1955):
"in case any dealer makes a grossly incorrect report, or a report that is false
or fraudulent it shall be the duty of the commissioner to make an estimate
for the taxable period of retail sales. . . ." For comparative legislation see ap-
plicable section of sales tax acts as listed in note 18 infra.
17. See, e.g., California Retail Sales Act, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 6511
(Deering 1952) which reads in part, "if any person fails to make a return, the
board shall make an estimate of the amount of the gross receipts of the
person, or, as the case may be, of the amount of the total sales price of tangible
personal property sold. . . . Upon the basis of the estimate the board shall
compute and determine the amount required to be paid to the State. . ....
For comparative legislation see applicable section of sales tax acts as listed
in note 18 infra.
18. While the sales tax statutes for the main part tax "sales at retail" or
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In sales tax statutes the need for notice and a right to be heard are
also essential where the statute provides, as they frequently do,
that the additional tax so computed by the board, plus a penalty for
underpayment, becomes a lien against the property of the taxpayer.19
Often such sections further provide that the board may take "judg-
ment" for the additional tax and penalty 20 or declare a distress warrant
just "sales" it is frequently difficult to determine just what constitutes such
a sale. Many items under the statute are exempted or included; accurate
descriptions of all such articles and items to be excluded or included in the
sales tax return is impossible because of varied forms taken in the modern
retail businesses. For example, difficulty has arisen in the following cases:
City Paper Co. v. Long, 235 Ala. 652, 180 So. 324 (1938) (is wrapping paper
sold to retailer for consumption sold at retail?); Lone Star Cement Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 234 Ala. 465, 175 So. 399 (1937) (is cement a building ma-
terial and thus taxable?); Doby v. State Taxing Com'n, 234 Ala. 150, 174
So. 233 (1937) (are automobile parts used to repair used cars bought by
automobile repair shop for resale used in "wholesale or retail" trade?);
Cusick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 204, 84 S.W.2d 14 (1935) (are photographs
subject to sales tax?); Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E.
117 (1937) (do sales of building materials to contractors to be used in a lump
sum contract constitute "sales at retail"?).
The cases on this point are voluminous in number. Many of them are
collected in a series of annotations. See Annots., 98 A.L.R. 837 (1935), 111
A.L.R. 943 (1937), 115 A.L.R. 491 (1938), 139 A.L.R. 372 (1942), 11 A.L.R.2d
926 (1950).
For the sales tax acts now in force in the various states listing the various
items that constitute sales at retail and further listing exemptions, see:
Alabama: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, §§ 752-786 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
California: CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 6051-6095 (Deering 1952).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 138-6-1 to 138-6-42 (1953).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 940c-956c (Supp. 1953).
D.C.: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2601 to 47-2629 (Supp. 1954).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 120, §§ 440-453 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1955).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 422.42-422.59 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
Kansas: KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-3601 to 79-3623 (Supp. 1955).
Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. 47: 301--47:318 (Supp. 1954).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 17 (Supp. 1955).
Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.521 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
Mississippi: Miss. ANN. CODE §§ 10103-10140 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 144.010-.590 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164 to 105-187 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
North Dakota: N.D. REV. CODE §§ 57-3901 to 57-3925 (Supp. 1953).
Ohio: OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5739.01-.99 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1954).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. §§ 68-1251 to 68-1251m (Supp. 1955).
Rhode Island: R.I. Laws 1947, c. 1887, act 2.
South Carolina: S.C. CODE §§ 65-1351 to 65-1480 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
South Dakota: S.D. CODE §§ 57.31-.33 (Supp. 1952).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-3001 to 67-3048 (1955).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-15-1 to 59-15-22 (Supp. 1955).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.08.010-82.08.170 (Supp. 1955).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 999(1) to 999(30) (1955).
Wyoming: Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2501 to 32-2523 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
19. See, e.g., the Alabama Retail Sales Act, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 769
(1941), which provides, "The tax together with interest and penalties im-
posed by this article shall be a lien upon the property of any person subject
to the provisions of this article ... " For comparative legislation see note 18
supra.
20. See, e.g., the California Retail Sales Tax Act, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN.
§ 6736 (Deering 1952), which provides in part, "If any amount required to
be paid to the State under this part is not paid when due, the board may
within three years... [make] a request that judgment be entered against the
1956 ]
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for its collection. 2' While such a "judgment" is not a term of art
requiring all the antecedent steps necessary for an ordinary civil
judgment, the net effect is much the same, as all that the taxing
authorities must do to have it become fully operative is to take the
"judgment" to the county court clerk of the residence of the tax-
payer and have the clerk swear out a warrant for its collection.
22
Thereupon the sheriff of the county is vested with full authority to
proceed against the property of the taxpayer for payment of the
"judgment" in the manner that he sees fit under the existing local
law. In such situations the sales tax statutes call for "notice" to be
given to the taxpayer, but such notice need not be in the form of
personal service of process necessary in private litigation.23
In relation to the ancient field of taxation in general, the retail sales
tax acts are a comparatively new income raising device. Thus, in
no small degree, the type of notice required in tax matters neces-
sary to satisfy due process really developed in the realm of the
much older real property taxation. Here it has been established that
when a statute fixes the time and place the tax board is to meet,
in order to authorize and equalize assessments, the statute itself
gives notice to the taxpayer, and no further notice is required in order
to satisfy due process.24 However, where the statute provides that
notice of some type is necessary, compliance with the statutory
provisions for notice is a necessary element of due process, and the
state cannot successfully contend that, consistent with due process,
the statute fixing the time and place of the board meeting is of itself
sufficient notice.2 5
person in the amount required to be paid. . . ." Section 6737 adds: "The county
clerk immediately upon filing of the certificate shall enter a judgment for the
people of the State of California against the person in the amount required
to be paid...."
21. See, e.g., the Tennessee Sales Tax Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3033 (Cum.
Supp. 1955), which provides in part, "The commissioner of finance and taxation
is empowered and it shall be his duty when any tax becomes delinquent under
this chapter to issue a distress warrant for the collection of the tax, interest,
and penalty from each delinquent taxpayer. .. ." The statute further authorizes
the sheriff to levy on the taxpayer's personal property to satisfy the "warrant"
or upon his real estate if sufficient personality cannot be located.
22. For a case upholding the validity of this procedure and construing the
provisions of the California "judgment" collection statute (outlined in note 20
supra), see People v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d 349, 115 P.2d 488 (1941).
23. For a listing of notice provisions see the applicable section of the ap-
propriate retail sales acts as listed in note 18 supra. A typical notice pro-
vision is outlined in ALA. CODE ANx. tit. 51 § 767 (Cum. Supp. 1953), which
provides in part, "the department shall notify the taxpayer by registered mail
of the amount of such assessment, and shall notify the taxpayer to appear be-
fore the department not less than twenty days from date of such notice
and show cause why such assessment should not be made final." If the taxpayer
fails to appear the assessment becomes final and "judgment" is entered.
24. See, e.g., Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321 (1885); Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 10 F.2d 506, 507 (D. Colo. 1926) (dictum); Yuma
County v. Arizona & S.R. Co., 30 Ariz. 27, 243 Pac. 907 (1926).




Where statutory notice is required with respect to making assess-
ments, as distinguished from notice effected by a statute fixing the
time and place of meeting of the assessing board, due process may be
satisfied through newspaper publication of the increased assessments
if the statute so provides.6 Notice by post card duly mailed and re-
ceived has also been held to constitute effective legal notice.2 7 More-
over, when statutory notice is required, the provision is generally
that such notice may legally be accomplished by mail. Sometimes
the use of registered mail is required, but more frequently any
letter properly addressed to the last known address of the taxpayer
is sufficient. The courts generally hold that written notice mailed
pursuant to a statutory provision authorizing notice by mail satisfies
due process of law.2
Required mailed notice in order to be effective must, however,
meet the requirements of giving the taxpayer sufficient opportunity
to receive the letter and a chance to be heard. Thus, where a statute
requires notice to be mailed to the taxpayer, and the notice is mailed
by the tax board an "unreasonably short time" before the taxpayer
is to appear before the board, such notice has not satisfied the re-
quirements of due process. 29
Where the notice mailed to the taxpayer by the board states no
fixed time or date when the taxpayer is to appear to protest the
additional assessment, it has been held that there was no denial of
due process, since the lack of a fixed time and date to appear did
not prevent the taxpayer from having an opportunity for making a
"timely" appearance before the board.30
While all these rules are not applicable to sales taxation, the courts
do borrow from this history in determining the validity of notice
under the sales tax statutes. To show the application of the mentioned
doctrines to sales tax controversies, it is necessary to turn to a few
sales tax cases in point. In People v. Skinner,1 the California sales
tax statute required a recomputation by the Board of Equalization in
cases where the taxpayer had underpaid his tax. The taxpayer,
26. Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526 (1895); State
ex rel. Foreman v. Wheatley, 113 Miss. 555, 74 So. 427 (1917).
27. Graham v. Lasater, 26 S.W. 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
28. For a general discussion and excellent case coverage on real property
assessment and collector actions see: Annots., 84 A.L.R. 197 (1933), 24 A.L.R.
331 (1923); 1 IERRILL, NOTICE § 521 (1952).
29. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 355, 233 Pac. 922
(1925) (seven days before taxpayer was to appear is an "unreasonably short
time"). Generally the statutes require notice from twenty to ninety days in
advance. Note applicable provisions of sales tax states as listed in note 18 supra.
The requirement seemingly reduced itself to a "reasonable time" before the
taxpayer's appearance is necessary. See, e.g., Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64
(1920).
30. Graham v. County Comm'rs, 99 Pa. Super. 245 (1930).
31. 18 Cal. 2d 349, 115 P.2d 488, 149 A.L.R. 299 (1941).
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under the provisions of the sales tax statute, computed his own tax
and filed his return. After an audit by the taxing authorities the tax
was recomputed by the Board at a substantially higher figure.
Notice of the additional assessment was mailed to the taxpayer
as provided for in the California statute. Later the taxpayer was
adjudged a bankrupt and the instant action was brought to have
the state's tax "judgment" set aside and dissolved on the grounds that
the "judgment" as obtained violated the taxpayer's rights under
the due process clause. Over taxpayer's objection that the lack
of personal service was a denial of due process, the court held that
notice by mail was not such a denial. Thus, the state's "judgment"
for the amount of the sales tax due was valid and binding on the
taxpayer, constituting a statutory lien against his real property.
A later case, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion,32 arising under the same California statute, serves to show
how far the requirement of notice may be relaxed without constituting
a denial of due process. The taxpaying corporation filed a suit for a
refund for sales taxes paid in the amount of $324,953.94, plus interest.
When the taxpayer had filed his original sales tax return, certain items
were in dispute. The Board recomputed the original assessment, dis-
allowing various items, and assessed the additional amount in con-
troversy. Notice of the additional assessment was mailed to the
taxpaying corporation's home office where it was received by the
comptroller. However, the notice was never transmitted to the
attorneys of the corporation who had charge of the entire matter
and who had been handling all the details of the transaction be-
tween the corporation and the Board of Equalization prior to the
mailing of the notice. A relevant statute required that any applica-
tion for refund must be brought by the claimant within ninety days
after the receipt of such mailed notice. Before the suit for refund
was instituted, the ninety-day period had expired. Taxpayer claimed
that since proper officials had not, in fact, received the notice, due
process had not been satisfied. The court rejected taxpayer's argu-
ment. In holding the notice sufficient to satisfy due process require-
ments, the court stated, in part: "We hold that the statutory method
of service of a notice of disallowance of claim by mailing addressed
to the party, as here applied to the Company, is just and reasonable
and satisfies due process and that, although addressing a notice to
counsel contrary tor or in excess of the statutory requirements might
in this case have prevented the injury, due process did not require
respondent to take such a measure, the less so because the manner
in which the injury occurred was not readily foreseeable, and was
caused by the lack of care of appellant's [tax payer's] employees.' '33
32. 285 P.2d 305 (Cal. Dist. App. 1955). "
33. Id., 285 P.2d at 309.
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Since taxpayer had not filed his claim within the ninety-day statu-
tory period allowed for a refund, he had waived his claim against the
state. Having chosen to rest his case solely on the alleged due process
invalidity of the statutory procedure, without following the steps pro-
vided for in the statute for refund, taxpayer lost everything when
the court decided against him on the due process issue of validity.
The writer is aware of no reason why taxpayer could not have
pursued both avenues of seeking relief. By making a timely claim
for a refund, as provided for in the statute, taxpayer would then have
been able to press for a refund after the court decided against him
in his due process attack on the validity of the whole collection
scheme.
The elasticity of the due process requirement with respect to
notice in sales tax collection proceedings is further shown by the
case of Campbell v. State.34 There the statute required that notice of
sales tax deficiency should be mailed to the taxpayer by registered
letter twenty days before "judgment" was to be entered. The tax-
payer, an out-of-state resident, duly filed his return. However, the
Board recomputed the tax due, disallowing certain exemptions claimed
by the taxpayer and assessed a sales tax deficiency. The Board mailed
a letter of this action to the taxpayer. Ignoring the letter, the taxpayer
continued to sell at retail within the state, and the state brought
a suit in equity to enjoin the taxpayer from doing further business
in the state until he paid the assessment. The taxpayer defended the
injunction suit on the ground that the state's sales tax judgment
was invalid for want of proper service of process; therefore, he
argued, there were no grounds for the issuance of an injunction.
The court overruled the taxpayer's defense and granted the injunction.
In holding that the former tax judgment against the taxpayer was
valid the court was careful to state that a personal judgment cannot
be entered against an out-of-state resident who has been served
by mail alone, but the court added that there is a distinction between
substituted service of process after the proceeding is begun and
constructive process in the first instance, and concluded, "The prin-
ciple is fully established that when a person is personally before
the court in the proceeding either because he himself instituted it, or
because he had personal service of the original process in the forum,
all action taken thereafter in that proceeding or supplementary to it,
may be begun by substituted service .... [T]he taxpayer instituted this
proceeding [referring to the original action of the state in taking out
a tax "judgment"] by making his returns to the State Department of
Revenue, and thereby submitted himself .personally and generally
to its jurisdiction. . . . Notice and hearings and other matters
34. 242 Ala. 215, 5 So. 2d 466 (1941).
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after acquiring such jurisdiction could be given by substituted service,
if sufficient to afford procedural due process.... We find here no vio-
lation of due process as a consequence of the nature of service on
the taxpayer in a proceeding begun by him."35 Such a holding that
the mere filing of the return gives the state personal jurisdiction over
the taxpayer so that the state may maintain all subsequent proceed-
ings by mailed notice is certainly a dangerous element when it is
considered that the sale of property located within the state to satisfy
the judgment so obtained is the first the taxpayer may actually know
of the proceedings.
Not all courts have been so ready to go along with the taxing
authorities as to the requirements of due process in tax matters under
various taxing statutes. In Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State Board of
Equalization of Wyoming,36 the plaintiff taxpayers sought relief
from an alleged illegal assessment of the Wyoming sales tax. The
state levied an original sales tax assessment against the taxpayer in-
cluding an assessment on property that was exempt from such
taxation under the statute. The Wyoming Retail Sales Tax Act was
for the main part a direct copy of the California statute dealing with
the same subject. However, certain important safeguards had been
omitted from the Wyoming statute. The Wyoming statute required
that any amount of sales tax assessed by the Board became there-
after, irrevocably fixed. The taxpayer was allowed no hearing at all
until after the amount of tax so assessed by the Board had been
paid into the state treasury. There was no provision in the statute to
compel a refund in cases where the tax was erroneously assessed and
paid under protest. There were no requirements that notice be given
to the taxpayer at any stage of the proceedings. In holding such a
statute invalid as arbitrarily depriving the taxpayer of his property
without due process of law, the court stated in part: "It is apparent
that in the California Act the entire tax fund is appropriated and ear-
marked for the purpose of payment of refunds and therefore any
judgment for the recovery of illegal taxes would be enforceable
against the official by whom they are collected. Just why this
seemingly logical and just provision was not carried into the Wyoming
legislation is not apparent .... I take it to be the law that there is a
lack of due process and the inherent right of the taxpayer has been
invaded when he is required to pay the tax before a hearing is had and
before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, unless there is some pro-
vision legal and enforceable in its effect by which he is entitled to
be restored to his former position."37 Thus in Morrison-Knudson it is
seen that the legislature, while well within its rights in providing
35. Id., 5 So. 2d at 471.
36. 35 F. Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940).
37. Id. at 557.
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for a summary method of collecting sales taxes, may not deprive
the taxpayer of his property with an arbitrary denial of notice and
hearing leaving him no method whatsoever for protesting the assess-
ment of the illegal tax or recovering the taxes so paid.
It is evident that the legislature must leave at least some safeguards
for the protection of the taxpayer. This premise is again seen in
Johnson v. Diefendor, 38 where the plaintiff taxpayer was successful
in his suit to enjoin the commissioner of taxation from collecting an
assessment under the Idaho sales tax act, as a violation of the due
process clause. Many reasons were advanced by the court as a
basis for the due process infirmities of the Idaho statute. In essence,
however, the collective provisions of the statute were thought to
be a denial of due process because of their arbitrary methods. The
act provided for a recomputation and reassessment by the commission
of the sales tax for fraud, omissions, or mistaken computation by the
taxpayer-retailer. Such reassessments of additional taxes were to
"be immediately due and payable." The taxpayer was given no
notice of this recomputation and additional assessment, which be-
came a lien against the real and personal property of the taxpayer.
The commissioner was then authorized to sell any and all of
taxpayer's property at public auction to satisfy the sales tax lien
anytime within the two years after the date it was determined that
the additional tax was due and owing. The statute further prohibited
suits at law or equity to prevent or enjoin collection of the tax;
and taxpayer's only remedy was a protest payment followed by a
suit for a refund. The court held, "When a retailer has in his possession
taxes which he has collected from the purchasers, and fails to account
for and pay over the money due from him, it may be collected by legal
proceedings provided for like cases, but to place in the hands of the
agent [tax authority] of his creditor [taxing state] such arbitrary
powers as are attempted to be conferred by... [the Idaho Sales Tax
Act] is to deny to the debtor [complaining taxpayer] due process
of law, in violation of Idaho Constitution art. 1, § 13, and the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."3 9
Interesting to note is that the decision also stated as a ground of
unconstitutionality the additional fact that the statute conferred
judicial powers on the executive branch of the government that was
contrary to the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
While the Johnson decision may appear somewhat contrary to the
weight of authority in sales tax constitutional questions, it is easily
distinguishable from most of the other cases in that the Johnson
tax collection procedure was completely arbitrary. As the court
construed the taxing statute the taxpayer was afforded no notice or
38. 56 Idaho 620, 57 P.2d 1068 (1936).
39. Id., 57 P.2d at 1072-73.
1956 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
opportunity to resist the additional assessment, and the first notice
the taxpayer would receive would be when the commissioner sold
his property in payment of the tax lien. The statutory provision for
a protest payment followed by a suit for refund was rendered com-
pletely void as the taxpayer under the statute received no notice
as to the proper time to institute such a suit. Indeed, the statute
provided such arbitrary methods of collection that title to the
taxpayer's property might pass under a tax sale while he remained
completely unaware that any proceeding had been instituted against
him. However, the court expressly pointed out that the unconstitu-
tionality of the collection procedure did not render the tax act
void in its entirety. The court stated that the other sections of the
sales tax act were valid and entitled to full force and effect and
indicated that the defect in the collection procedure could be
cured by passing an ammendment to the act providing for notice, thus
giving the Idaho Sales Tax Act the same safeguards present in other
sales tax measures in sister states. This case, as well as others,
seem to indicate that at least some form of notice is necessary in
order that protest payment followed by suit for refund be an adequate
remedy. However, such notice need not be in the form of personal
service of process.
It has long been held that if the taxpayer is afforded an oppor-
tunity for a hearing at some stage of the tax collection proceedings,
due process is satisfied. 4° The hearing apparently does not have to
be judicial in nature and due process is satisfied by a hearing before
an administrative tribunal.4 1 Again, the requirement of a hearing is
not necessary before the tax becomes due or judgment is entered
thereon where the tax is self assessing, requiring no evaluation to be
made by a judicial tribunal.42 Even where the assessments are irregular
in nature, the courts will endeavor to give them full force and effect by
not letting a technical error on the part of the administrative board
defeat the collection of the tax.43 Frequently the taxpayer is denied
judicial review of the entire action, where such review might other-
wise have been available, if he fails to avail himself of the statutory
40. See, e.g., Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905); Powell v.
Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47 (1937); People v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d 349, 115
P.2d 488 (1941); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S.E.2d 328 (1939); State v.
Standard Oil Co., 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601 (1938); Henry v. Manzella, 356 Mo.
305, 201 S.W.2d 457 (1947); Douglas County v. State Bd. of Equalization and
Assessment, 158 Neb. 325, 63 N.W.2d 449 (1954); Obion County v. Coulter, 153
Tenn. 469, 284 S.W. 372 (1924); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 100 S.W.2d
754 (Tex. Civ. App), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 724 (1937); see also Note, Admin-
istrative Law-Notice and Opportunity For Hearing-Tax Assessment Statute,
29 N.C.L. REv. 169 (1951).
41. Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).
42. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934); In re 801-815 East New York
Avenue Borough, 290 N.Y. 236, 48 N.E.2d 502 (1943).




administrative remedies. This is seemingly but another application
of the doctrine that administrative remedies must be exhausted first,
where they are available, before the taxpayer can resort to judicial
action concerning the controversy. The courts hold that the taxpayer
is "estopped" to demand judicial review by not complying with the
statute providing for proper administrative determination at the
first instance.4 As one author has stated the issue: "The interests of
the taxpayer are sacrificed to the administrative conveniences of
the tax district. '45
In the absence of such estoppel by failure properly to follow the
remedies outlined in the taxing statute, the general rule is that even
though the taxpayer may be thought by the court to be entitled to
judicial review, so long as he is granted judicial review at some stage
of the proceedings before he is actually deprived of his property,
whether such review comes by way of direct or collateral attack,
the requirement of judicial review is satisfied.46 As a general rule
the sales tax acts provide for judicial review by way of a protest
payment of the tax followed by a suit for refund against the taxing
authority [i.e., board] which must be prosecuted within a certain
period.47
2. Limitations on the Use of the Injunction in Tax Collections
A. Scope of Injunctive Relief Available to Taxpayer. Frequently
the taxpayer may protest the payment of the sales tax by a collateral
attack upon the taxing authorities by way of injunctive proceedings or
an action for declaratory judgment. The scope of injunctive relief,
however, is generally limited, and it is difficult to determine the con-
ditions under which the taxpayer will be allowed to seek injunctive
relief.
At one time it was the rule in the United States that the courts
of equity under no circumstances would entertain an action to enjoin
44. First Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450 (1924); Stan-
ley v. Supervisors, 121 U.S. 535 (1887); Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Los
Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 319, 217 P.2d 946 (1950).
45. Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to
Administrative Remedies, 28 MicH. L. REV. 637, 638 (1930).
46. Cf. People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E.
296 (1934); see also, Faught, Procedure for the Assessment of Real Estate for
Taxation Purposes and the Review of such Assessments, 6 U. PrIT. L. REV. 231
(1940); Note, Extent of Judicial Review of Administrative Tax Determinations
in West Virginia, 50 W. VA. L. REv. 75 (1947).
47. See, e.g., the Tennessee Sales Tax Statute which provides [from TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-3033 (Cum. Supp. 1955) by cross reference]: "The person
paying said revenue .. .[under protest may] at anytime within thirty (30)
days after making said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said of-
ficer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof." TENN. CODE ANN. §
67-2305 (1955). For similar provision see applicable section of sales tax
statutes listed in note 18 supra.
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or to interfere with the collection of taxes.48 However, this is no
longer the rule and courts of equity will now enjoin the collection
of a tax not authorized by law,49 but as the present day rule is the
summation of the exceptions that the courts of equity made to the
old rule from time to time, there seemingly still persists an idea
that injunctive suits presumptively will not lie. As the very nature of
equitable relief is generally said to be based on "equity between the
parties in the particular circumstances of the case at bar" concrete
rules are difficult to formulate. Some propositions of law can be
deduced from the authorities, however. It is axiomatic that equity
will not enjoin the collection of a tax where there is a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy at law.50 This limitation, of course, includes the
situation where the taxing statute itself provides for an adequate
remedy in its own terms.51 An adequate remedy is generally to be
found if the statute provides for a payment of taxes under protest
followed by a suit for refund,5 2 or even in a separate law action for
money had and received.53
In Fox v. Standard Oil Co.,54 the Supreme Court of the United
States has made it clear that not every payment of a tax under pro-
test with a suit for refund will constitute an adequate remedy at
law. There the statute provided for the payment of the tax and
,subsequent refund suit against the tax commissioners, but the
statute failed to make clear that the judgment if so obtained against
the commissioners could be collected by any means except by legisla-
tive appropriation. The Court affirmed that the equitable relief sought
by the taxpayer was justified. The Court made it clear that if pay-
ment under protest followed by a suit for refund was to bar equitable
relief, final payment to the taxpayer must not rest on the whim and
caprice of the legislature but must be on a concrete and irrevocable
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Albright, 208 U.S. 548 (1908) (discussion of the rule);
Wagner v. Leenhouts, 208 Wis. 292, 242 N.W. 144, appeal dismissed, 287 U.S.
571 (1932) (leading case); DeWitt v. Hayes, 2 Cal. 463, 56 Am. Dec. 352 (1852);
Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 654 (1875).
49. See Bristor v. Board of Assessors, 346 Ill. 362, 179 N.E. 120, 78 A.L.R.
686 (1931).
50. Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 284 U.S. 530 (1932); Skagit County v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 61 F.2d 638, 86 A.L.R. 1012 (9th Cir. 1932); Casco Co. v.
Thurston County, 163 Wash. 666, 2 P.2d 677 (1931); Boyd v. City of Selma,
96 Ala. 144, 11 So. 393 (1892). Presently we will see that the power of the
federal district courts to grant injunctive relief is now limited by statute
to those situations where the taxing authority does not afford taxpayer a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy at law. See note 72 infra.
51. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U.S. 122 (1922); see also Indiana
Mfg. Co. v. Koehne, 188 U.S. 681 (1903) (payment of taxes under protest fol-
lowed by a suit for a refund held to be an "adequate" remedy so as to preclude
equitable relief). The Court also stated that multiplicity of suits which would
result if taxpayer followed his remedies under the statutes afforded no
ground for equitable relief.
52. Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121 (1930).
53. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
54. 294 U.S. 87 (1935).
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basis. Again if the tax statute providing a "vague" remedy for refund
of taxes wrongfully collected has not been construed by the highest
court of the state in such manner that a clear and uninhibited path
lies open to the taxpayer for the return of the taxes paid under pro-
test, the United States Supreme Court will not hold that such an
untried remedy is adequate so as to preclude equitable relief.5 5 Too,
if the legal remedy is not exclusive, equitable relief may also be had.
However, there are no grounds for equitable relief merely because the
taxpayer had an adequate remedy at law and lost it by failure to
prosecute it during a prescribed statutory period.5 6
Equitable relief may also be obtained in some cases where the
attempted collection of taxes will cause the taxpayer irreparable
injury regardless of the adequacy of his remedy under the statute or
at law.57 However, irreparable injury is extremely hard to prove
and limited somewhat to the attempted collection of taxes against
property that is peculiarly valuable and where its seizure cannot
adequately be compensated for by damages.5 Nevertheless, where the
only alleged illegality of the tax lies in over-assessment, equitable re-
lief will not lie and the taxpayer must pursue his remedies under the
statute.59
Where the statute is within itself so arbitrary and so clearly a
denial of due process that an attempt to follow the provisions laid
out within it would clearly afford no relief to the taxpayer, 0 equitable
relief may constitute a proper remedy, but in every instance the
courts will lean heavily upon a strong presumption in favor of the
statute and the taxpayer may be forced to pursue the remedy called for
by the statute, and as a result the equitable relief will be denied.
Nor do there appear to be grounds for injunctive relief for the reason
that the statutory requirements compelling a vendor to collect the
sales tax are too burdensome financially to the vendor. In Fox v.
Frank6 ' the plaintiff vendor brought suit to enjoin the state from re-
55. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923).
56. Bismark Water Supply Co. v. Barnes, 30 N.D. 555, 153 N.W. 454 (1915).
57. See Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891).
58. See, e.g., H. W. Metcalf Co. v. Martin, 54 Fla. 531, 45 So. 463 (1907), in
which the court held not sufficient a mere general allegation that to deprive
taxpayer of his pool table for failure to pay a license tax would constitute
irreparable injury since the pool table could be replaced.
59. City of Gadsden v. American Nat'l Bank, 225 Ala. 490, 144 So. 93 (1932).
For an interesting discussion of this point showing the limits to which courts
will go to interpret the wrong alleged by the taxpayer to be merely "over as-
sessment" or "irregularity," as well as for a complete listing of cases on the
subject, see, Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort
to Administrative Remedies, 28 MIhcH. L. REv. 637 (1930).
60. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932); Inland Milling
Co. v. Huston, 11 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Iowa 1935); Grand Island & W.C.R.R. v.
Dawes County, 62 Neb. 44, 86 N.W. 934 (1901); Graves v. Moore County
Comm'rs, 135 N.C. 49, 47 S.E. 134 (1904); Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co.
v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 382 (1898); see also Annot., 108 A.L.R. 184 (1937).
61. 52 Ohio App. 483, 3 N.B.2d 996 (1935).
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quiring plaintiff to collect a tax on his sales of farm produce, on
the ground that the collection machinery forced him to incur the
almost prohibitive cost of a bookkeeper, thus violating the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, as well as depriving plaintiff of
his right under the Ohio Constitution to acquire and sell property.
Plaintiff was a small farmer who sold his product at a consumer's
market. Rejecting taxpayer's argument because of the state's broad
power to tax and to prescribe the rules for tax collection, the court
refused the injunction. While complainant based his objection on
constitutional grounds, nevertheless the court, in rather sweeping
language, declared, "One who is required by law to collect a tax may
not refuse to do so on the ground that the provisions of the law
requiring the payment of the tax to the collector [plaintiff-vendor] are
invalid."62
B. Use of the Injunction by the Taxing Authority. It seems that only
rarely are the courts asked by the state to use the injunctive process
to force the vendor to collect a sales tax. The rarity of this occur-
rence may be partly explained by the fact that the vendor is normally
reimbursed by the state, out of his collections, for expenses incurred in
the collection of the tax. An obstinate vendor was before the court
in State ex rel. Rice v. Allen,63 however, defending against a petition
for a mandatory injunction to require him to collect the sales tax
from his purchasers. The court granted the injunction, very de-
tailed in its instructions regarding compliance with the statute. One
ground for resisting the injunction was that criminal sanctions were
provided to enforce collection of the tax, thus rendering it unnecessary
to resort to the equitable processes to enforce collections. Rejecting
that defense, the court adopted the view of a text writer that the
"fact that conduct is punishable criminally does not constitute an ade-
quate remedy so as to bar equitable relief."64 It also based its de-
cision, in part, on the fact that the efficiency of the state taxing author-
ity was being impaired by the defendant's action, i.e., extra audits of
defendant's books were required, etc.
3. The Use of the Declaratory Judgment in Tax Collection Matters
A procedural device that is coming more to the forefront in obtain-
ing relief against the enforcement of an illegal tax is an action for a
declaratory judgment. But here, as in equity suits, the availability
of such a remedy is somewhat limited by restrictions imposed upon
its use both by statute and by the courts themselves. Nevertheless,
the field of declaratory relief is growing steadily in connection with
tax matters. Even states that deny the use of an injunctive proceeding
62. Id., 3 N.E.2d at 997 (syllabus by the court).
63. 180 Miss. 659, 177 So. 763 (1938).
64. 2 LAWRENCE, EQUTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1099 (1929).
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to curtail the collection of taxes will in some instances grant declara-
tory relief. It is easy to see the reasons for such growth, because a
declaratory judgment action ordinarily offers a swift and inexpensive
remedy for a final determination of the legality of a tax statute,
expedient to collector and taxpayer alike. It will be recalled that one of
the major objections presented to bar relief sought by taxpayers
against the taxing authorities was that the government needed the tax
monies to continue the functions of its business unhampered and
unimpeded by long and involved tax suits. This objection generally
is not open to those seeking to bar declaratory relief by the tax-
payer (or by the collecting authority attempting to enforce the tax)
for the action offers a speedy determination of the rights of the
parties in most instances, although it is to be conceded that a declara-
tory action might drag on at great length in cases where the court's
docket is extremely crowded.
In spite of the growing tendency on the part of the courts to look
with favor on declaratory action in the adjudication of tax questions,
some courts impose certain limitations on this remedy and thereby
prevent relief from being afforded the taxpayer suffering under the
attempted collection of illegal taxes. At least one court has stated that
such limitations to declaratory relief in tax matters stem from the
fact that the basic nature of declaratory action finds its existence in
the discretion of the court.65 While this doctrine has been criticized
as wrongfully characterizing the nature of declaratory action, the
courts are still somewhat hesitant in granting declaratory judgments
in tax matters. This hesitancy is indicated by the measures taken by
the courts in order to deny declaratory relief.
One means of judicial avoidance of relief through the declaratory
judgment has been what is perhaps an over-zealous application of the
doctrine that there must be an actual or justiciable controversy be-
fore a judicial remedy can be invoked.66 This requirement, of course,
is implicit in any law suit, including a suit for a declaratory judg-
ment, where the very nature of the action contains aspects of pre-
determination of rights prior to actual harm being done to one of
the parties. Doby v. State67 is illustrative of the principle that a
justiciable controVersy must exist. There plaintiff, operator of an
automobile repair shop, brought a declaratory action to determine
65. Collier Advertising Serv., Inc. v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (sales tax).
66. See, BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 40 (1941). For particular cases
holding that there must be a justicable controversy see, Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) (gasoline tax); Morrison-Knudson Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 35 F. Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940) (sales tax); Reese
v. Adamson, 297 Pa. 13, 146 Atl. 262 (1929) (here the court emphatically
stated that they would not give a "mere" advisory opinion on points of law as
to the taxpayer's liability if he followed a particular course of business).
67. 234 Ala. 150, 174 So. 233 (1937).
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whether it should collect the Alabama sales tax upon certain automo-
bile parts used and sold in plaintiff's business. The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to have adjudicated the question of tax liability
as to the parts it sold to customers to repair their cars; but where
the plaintiff repair shop bought certain old cars and reconditioned them
for resale using in the process certain parts from its stock of new
parts on hand, the court held that plaintiff raised no justiciable con-
troversy, not being a proper party to have the tax determined in
relation to the new parts so used. The court stated in part, "we deem
it pertinent to say the liability for a sales tax payable by the sellers
of parts, accessories, and equipment to the automobile repair shop
for use in reconditioning its cars, or materials and supplies con-
sumed, is not a justiciable issue before us. Such dealers are not
represented in this suit, nor are the facts disclosed as to such
business."68
In the Doby case the court also stressed that an essential element
of a declaratory judgment action is that all parties whose interest are
to be affected must be represented before the court. While this can
be true of any law suit, again the strictness with which it is en-
forced, at times, may be somewhat peculiar in the field of declaratory
judgments in tax matters.69 As the sellers of the new parts to the
automobile dealer were not represented before the court, the court
felt justified in refusing to decide the sales tax question applicable to
the unrepresented sellers. A like result was reached in Smithberger
v. Banning,7o where plaintiff, a corporation of gasoline marketers,
brought an original action to determine the validity of sales tax
questions as to certain retail sellers acting and operating under
the protection of the plaintiff. The court denied relief and refused
to hear the suit on the merits, holding that the corporation itself was
not the dealer subject to the tax who would be harmed by illegal en-
forcement of the tax measures, nor did the corporation have authority
to appear on behalf of its dealers.
In Southern R.R. v. Curry,71 the court held that the railroad was
not the proper party to contest the validity of a sales tax as applied
to the seller of carload lots of slag shipped over the plaintiff rail-
road's lines since the judgment would not bind the seller and the
state taxing authorities, the two primary persons involved. The
issue involved in the case was whether slag was "a building material"
and hence taxable under the Alabama Sales Tax Act.
The compass of declaratory judgment relief has been narrowed
in some jurisdictions on the ground that such relief will not be
68. Id., 174 So. at 236.
69. General Securities Co. v. Williams, 161 Tenn. 50, 29 S.W.2d 662 (1930),
70. 130,Neb: 354, 265 N.W. 10 (1936).
71. 239 Ala. 263, 194 So. 523 (1940).
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granted in tax cases where the taxpayer has available another method
of established relief. Especially has this doctrine been applied when
the suit for a declaratory judgment has been instituted in the fed-
eral courts. There the impediment to such relief is found in a federal
statute, commonly known as the Johnson Act, which provides: "The
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy,
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."72
The impact of this statute was felt in Collier Advertising Services v.
City of New York 3 where a federal court was confronted with the
question whether the ban of the Johnson Act includes a suit for a
declaratory judgment without injunctive relief. The court held that
the Johnson Act did forbid the suit, since" the Act denies jurisdiction
to the district court of suits to enjoin, suspend or restrain assess-
ment and collection of state taxes. Then the court concluded that
to permit the declaratory judgment suit, although not coupled with
a prayer for injunctive relief, would substantially nullify the John-
son Act. The Court further observed that public officials are ex-
pected to respect the court's declaration and to follow its interpreta-
tion of the laws. Such a voluntary submission averts the need of
an injunction, thought the Court, but accomplishes precisely the
same result. While there is no definitive declaration by the Supreme
Court of the United States on the question whether the Johnson Act
proscribes a suit for a declaratory judgment where an injunction is
not asked, nevertheless the Court has indicated that such a suit does
fall within the ban of the Johnson Act.7 4 Also, lower federal court
cases, other than the Collier case, had assumed that the remedy
of the declaratory judgment fell within the conditional prohibition
of the injunctions.7 5
The state courts, unshackled by the Johnson Act, have been much
more ready to grant declaratory relief to the taxpayer. 6 The leading
case in the field is Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace.
77
While this case was a determination by the Supreme Court of the
United States, it involved a suit instituted in the state court and
continued through the judicial processes of the state. In that case the
State of Tennessee imposed an excise tax upon the storers and dis-
72. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1950).
73. 32 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
74. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943);
see also Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 253 (1952)
(dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas).
75. See West Pub. Co. v. McColgan, 138 F.2d 320, 326 (9th Cir. 1943). For a
discussion of the subject of federal court interference with the assessment
and collection of state taxes, including the declaratory judgment suit, see
Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State
Taxes, 59 HARv. L. REv. 780 (1946).
76. See, BoRcHARn, DECLARATORY JUDGMExTs 826 (1941).
77. 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
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tributors of gasoline. Plaintiff railway brought a declaratory action
contending that it was neither a storer nor a distributor and hence
a state could not tax the gasoline held by it. Over the objection of
the state that a state statute forbade any suit to enjoin or interfere
with the collection of taxes within the state and the only remedy
under the same statute was a protest payment and suit for refund,
the court entertained the declaratory action. The Supreme Court
of the United States affirmed the action of the lower courts holding
that in such circumstances declaratory relief was a proper remedy as
it offered a speedy and efficient method of ascertaining the rights of
the parties. No injunctive relief was asked.
In Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York,78 the court rejected the
argument of the state taxing authority to the effect that the tax-
payer could not maintain an action for declaratory relief from the ad-
verse effects of a sales tax because he should follow the general pro-
cedure for recovering taxes improperly assessed as outlined in the
state statute. The court gave as its reasons for so holding that to follow
the taxing authorities' line of argument would lead to multiplicity of
suits. In addition the court stated that the state statute could be so
construed that the taxpayer, who collected the tax from customers,
might not have standing to sue at all in the state courts as the state
might interpose a defense to the effect that taxpayer's customers were
the real parties harmed, and that such a construction would deprive
the taxpayer entirely of any right to be heard. The court then
proceeded to hold that the taxpayer had a valid cause for his
declaratory judgment action, and the remedy under the state statute
did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Even though this retailer
was only a "collector" of the tax, he was still the proper party to
institute the suit.
A like result was reached in Department of Treasury v. J. P. Michael
Co.,7 9 where the court held that payment of taxes under protest as
provided in the state statute followed by a suit for refund was not
an "adequate remedy so as to preclude declaratory judgment action."
As a broader ground for permitting the suit, the court thought that
protest payment-refund procedure was an "additional and cumulative"
remedy and not "exclusive."
Therefore, while the rule in the federal courts under the Johnson
Act still maintains that declaratory relief, especially when an in-
junction also is requested, is not to be had where there are plain,
speedy and efficient remedies under the laws of that state, the
state courts are far less strict; in many states, even where there is
78. 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937).
79. 105 Ind. App. 255, 11 N.E.2d 512 (1937).
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an anti-tax injunction statute in force, the state courts will still
grant declaratory relief.80
Perhaps the most useful application of declaratory relief to questions
arising under the sales tax statutes is to be found in the growing
field of statutory construction in order to determine if certain items
are taxable or are exempt under the sales tax acts. As pointed out
earlier, it is frequently difficult to ascertain whether many transac-
tions constitute a "sale" or a "sale at retail" under the provisions of
the sales tax acts.81 The declaratory judgment offers a speedy and
efficient method whereby both the taxing authority and the tax-
payer can have adjudicated the question of the applicability of the
statute as to the particular transaction in question. Thus, in questions
involving the classification of the subject matter, whether certain
items are exempted under the statute, or whether the taxpayer is
immune from the tax, the declaratory action immediately solves the
problem of construction of the statute in question, allowing a de-
termination of the rights of the parties before the taxpayer is
deprived questionably of his property. Where such questions are in-
volved the courts are quick to look with favor upon declaratory ac-
tion and will seldom force the taxpayer to fall back upon the other
remedies provided in the sales tax statute even though such remedies
may be adequate.82
4. Summary Comment and Conclusions on Procedural Collection
Problems
By way of conclusion it may be stated that the field of due process in
dealing with problems arising from sales taxation is a product of the
history of the running fight between the states endeavoring to enforce
tax matters by the most summary methods as opposed to affording
complete protection to the taxpayer demanding relief from the
assessments. It can accurately be stated that the term due process of
law does not carry the abundant safeguards in the field of taxation
that are available to the litigant in the ordinary judicial proceedings.
Nevertheless, there is a point in the deprivation of property under
arbitrary tax laws beyond which the state cannot proceed, con-
sistent with the requirements of due process. The requirements of
notice and hearing are more greatly relaxed and it is firmly estab-
lished that notice by mail may be employed rather than personal
service of process. Such is the power of the customs long followed
by the states in tax collection matters, that all tax procedures are
80. In addition to cases listed supra, see also, Nachman v. State Tax
Comm'n, 233 Ala. 628, 173 So. 25 (1937); Peterson v. Central Arizona Light
& Power Co., 56 Ariz. 231, 107 P.2d 205 (1940); School Dist. v. Smith, 342 Mo.
21, 1.11 S.W.2d 167 (1937).
81. See note 18 supra. Many of these cases are declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings.
82. See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 839 (1941).
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granted a strong presumption as to their validity and the burden of
proof is on the taxpayer seeking to have the statute struck for want
of due process. The old adage of the right to "a day in court" has
been limited in many instances to a right before an administrative
tribunal, and even this right may be lost by the taxpayer if he fails
to follow the procedure granting him such rights as outlined in the
taxing statutes.
While relief is open to the taxpayer in some degree in equitable
suits for injunctions to restrain the taxing authorities, and in a
greater degree in declaratory actions, such relief is limited by
self-imposed judicial restrictions, and in many states narrowly re-
stricted by statute. Even in the federal courts the Johnson Act strictly
curtails such actions and the courts are quick to find adequate relief
either at law or at equity within the state and deny the use of the
federal courts for obtaining injunctions against state taxing authori-
ties.
While it is readily apparent that the state must be allowed the use
of summary methods of the collection of taxes in order to maintain a
steady income with which to operate its governmental functions un-
hampered and undelayed by long suits for the collection of taxes, it is
even more obvious that in the field of taxation the term due process
of law is not the shield of protection that it is in the greater realm
of the ordinary judicial proceeding.
PRoBLEs OF SUBSTANTIVE LIABmiTY OF PARTIES
1. The Incidence of the Tax and Liability of Parties
A. Collection of the Sales Tax from the Vendor and Vendee. In the
collection of sales taxes, one question which needs to be decided at
the outset is whether the real taxpayer is the vendor or the purchaser.
It has been decided that a statute requiring the vendor to collect the
sales tax from the buyer "insofar as it can be done" placed the in-
cidence of the tax on the vendor.8 3 In contrast, a statute requiring
the vendor to add the sales tax to the price of the article, "so far as
[is] practicable," was held to place the burden of the tax on the
consumer.84 It is thus evident that the question of whom the legisla-
ture intended to be the taxpayer may be a close one.
Some sales tax statutes and ordinances meet this problem by im-
posing the burden of the tax squarely on the vendor.85 The taxes in
83. Pacific Coast Engineering Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 244 P.2d 21
(1952).
84. Spencer v. Mero, 52 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1951).




these jurisdictions are treated as taxes on the occupation of making
retail sales, and are measured by a specified percentage of gross
receipts from these sales. This type of exaction was involved in
People's Drug Shop, Inc. v. Moysey,86 where a retailer sought to
recover from the purchaser the amount of such an occupation tax,
in addition to the purchase price of the article sold. Recovery was
denied. The court reasoned that a tax "upon persons engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property to purchasers for use
or consumption" was an occupation tax, the incidence of which fell
upon the retailer. The retailer therefore had no right to charge the
purchaser for the tax.
8) 7
Under this type of statute it may logically be inferred that the taxing
authority also would be precluded from collecting the tax from the
purchaser, should the vendor default. The burden of the tax is on
the vendor, and the vendor's tax debt ought not be shifted to the
purchaser by the vendor's failure to pay.
As previously noted, some statutes and ordinances are construed to
place the burden of the tax upon the consumer, with the vendor in
the position of tax collector. In such situations the enactment may
empower the state to collect the tax from either the vendor or the
purchaser, and to make the purchaser also liable, in the alternative,
to the vendor.P
This gives rise to a related problem. Since the burden of the tax
is deemed to be upon the consumer, with the vendor acting as col-
lector, may the state proceed against both, and thereby recover a
double tax? This problem was presented to the court in Fifth Avenue
Building Co. v. Joseph.89 There a purchaser sought the cancellation
of an assessment against him for sales taxes on his purchases of
coal in New York City. The city comptroller assessed the purchaser-
plaintiff with the full amount of the tax due on these sales, even though
part of the tax had been previously collected from the nonresident
vendor. The city claimed that unless it could force the purchaser
to pay the tax, the vendor could absorb it. This absorption, the city
further contended, would defeat the legislative policy of placing
the incidence of the tax on the consumer, and would allow one
vendor thereby to gain a price advantage over his competitors. The
court rejected this position of the taxing city. Instead, it decided
that the purchaser was liable only for the residue of the tax not
86. 384 Ill. 283, 51 N.E.2d 144 (1943).
87. Cf. Clary v. Basalt Rock Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 458, 222 P.2d 24 (1950).
88. See Saper v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1948) (dictum),
affirming in part and reversing in part In re Spotlight Productions, Inc., 75 F.
Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Davis v. Ponte Vedra Club, 78 So. 2d 858 (Fla.
1955); Troup Roofing Co. v. Dealers Supply Co., 91 Ga. App. 880, 87 S.E.2d
358 (1955).
89. 297 N.Y. 278, 79 N.E.2d 22 (1948).
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collected from the vendor by the city. The court thought that the
ordinance authorizing the city comptroller to collect the sales tax
from the vendor or the vendee contemplated only alternative methods
of collection. It also felt that the cases holding that the taxing author-
ity may collect from the vendee if he has not paid the vendor, envisage
only those instances wherein the city has not previously collected
them from the vendor. The court further thought that the granting
to the city of a double tax recovery would not effectuate the sup-
posed policy against allowing the vendor to gain a competitive ad-
vantage by absorbing the tax. Here the court seemed to rely on the
fact that if the vendor wilfully failed to charge the purchaser for the
tax, the vendor was made subject, by statute, to criminal sanctions.
B. Liability of Vendor for Stolen Sales Tax Monies. It is evident
that the incidence of the tax is basic to the question of the state's
authority to collect from the vendor and vendee. So, also, the answer
to the question of whether the vendor is liable for the theft of sales
tax monies collected from purchasers begins with a determination of
whether the burden of the tax is borne by the vendor or purchaser.
This in turn depends on the wording of the statute, and the court's
construction thereof.90 If the vendor is held to be the taxpayer, his
liability to the state for sales taxes is commensurate with his liability
for other tax obligations. This liability is therefore not affected by his
collection of the amount of the tax from the consumer, where there
is a subsequent theft of this money. All money received from the
consumer by the taxpaying vendor is part of the purchase price,
and therefore not related to the vendor's sales tax obligation to the
state.
If, on the other hand, the purchaser is the taxpayer and the
vendor the tax collector, the vendor may be deemed the agent of
the state,91 or the trustee for the state.92 An example of the vendor's
being treated as a trustee of the stolen tax money is found in Spencer
v. Mero.93 There the plaintiff vendor brought suit to enjoin defendant
sheriff from enforcing the payment of sales taxes collected by plain-
tiff from purchasers. This money had been kept separate from
vendor's other funds, and had been stolen along with vendor's own
money. The court decided that the vendor was only the tax collector,
and that if he could clearly prove that the money was stolen from
his place of business, then he could not be held liable for the
sales tax. The court felt that the vendor was not a voluntary trustee,
but that the normal principles governing a trust relationship should
apply.
90. See notes 83 and 84 supra.
91. Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 311 Pa. 539, 166 Atl. 883 (1933).
92. B. K. Sweeney Elec. Co. v. Poston, 110 Colo. 139, 132 P.2d 443 (1942).
93. 52 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1951).
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Another problem, which the court in the Spencer case recognized
but did not answer, would have arisen had the tax monies been com-
mingled with vendor's own personal funds. It seems probable that
the vendor would have been held liable for the tax. It would be diffi-
cult to prove that the money stolen was actually that collected,
especially if the vendor had cash deposited elsewhere. No "trust
fund" would have existed separately from the vendor's other monies.
Normally the very commingling by a trustee of trust funds with his
own monies will constitute a breach of his fiduciary relationship.9
In the absence of a statute making the vendor tax collector an
insurer to the state, the just requirement would seem to make the
vendor liable for stolen taxes collected from the taxpaying purchaser
only if the loss occurred through vendor's negligence. It would then
be for the court to decide whether, under the circumstances, the theft
resulted from the vendor's negligence, or the commingling of tax
monies with the vendor's own funds amounted to negligent conduct.
2. Effect of Collection Schedules Where Occupation and Retail Sales
Taxes Are Used
Some troublesome problems have developed in connection with the
use of tax collection schedules where both the occupation tax variety
of sales tax, as well as the retail sales tax are found in the same
jurisdiction. When a sales tax is of the type which is imposed on the
purchaser on individual sales at retail, the state tax administrator
will normally promulgate collection schedules to vendors who qol-
lect. These schedules are to facilitate the calculation of the tax,
and set forth the amount of tax to be collected from consumers on
each purchase, avoiding fractions of one cent. An unusual and interest-
ing problem arose in Wyoming in connection with the effect of the
statutory equivalent of such a collection schedule. In Walgreen Co. v.
State Board of Equalization,95 the statute required the vendor to
collect from the purchaser and pay to the state a two percent sales
tax on all individual sales of twenty-five cents or more. The statute
also required the vendor personally to pay to the state a one percent
tax on all sales of twenty-four cents or less. The latter tax was to
be paid by the vendor, and he was prohibited by the statute from
passing the tax on to the consumer. The tax collected from purchasers
by the plaintiff vendor, on sales of articles priced at twenty-five cents
or more, amounted to more than two percent of the proceeds of the
total sales of these articles.9 The vendor endeavored to apply this
94. 2 Scor, TRUSTS § 179.1 (1939).
95. 62 Wyo. 288, 166 P.2d 960 (1946).
96. Avoiding fractions of a cent creates the excess. Suppose, for example,
the vendor sold ten articles individually, each worth ninety cents. Each sale
would be taxed at 2%, to the nearest penny. The vendor in this instance
would collect two cents on each sale, for a total of twenty cents tax. This
twenty cents is more than 2o of the total sales of nine dollars.
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excess toward the amount due the state for his own one percent tax
on articles selling at twenty-four cents or less. The state resisted
vendor's attempts to do this, and contended that any proceeds in
excess of two percent collected from purchasers must be paid to the
state. The court upheld the state's view. It reasoned that the
vendor could not apply to the vendor's personal tax debt the money
collected from consumers. The court also thought that if the vendor
were allowed so to apply the excess collected from consumers, it
might negligently or designedly overcharge for tax on certain items
and undercharge on others, thereby acquiring an advantage over its
competitors.
It is a little difficult to understand this reasoning of the court,
unless it felt that if the vendor were not accountable to the state
for the excess, then it could overcharge or undercharge as market
competition permitted, thereby using the excess to manipulate prices.
It is submitted, however, that the vendor could be held strictly ac-
countable to the state if he were required to keep a correct account
of the sales on which he collected a tax, with the state having the
right to examine these records. The records would thus supposedly
show clearly the source of the excess. The actual basis of the holding,
however, is simply that the excess was paid by the customer to
discharge their tax obligations, and the court just could not con-
scientiously allow the vendor to apply it to vendor's own tax debt.
The intrinsic merit of the court's reasoning seems undeniable. 97
Another problem involved in the use of collection schedules has
arisen in connection with vendors whose sales are all below the first
collection bracket, where the state has a sales tax in the nature of
an occupation tax on the vendor, as well as a retail sales tax to be paid
by the purchasers. In Winslow-Spacarb, Inc. v. Evatt98 the owner of
a large number of vending machines, sold soft drinks from these
machines at five cents each. The vendor paid no tax on these sales
since a relevant Ohio statute, which imposed a tax on individual re-
tail sales, exempted from this tax each sale under nine cents. The
statute required that this tax be collected by the vendor from the
purchaser. There was also in force a separate emergency retailers oc-
cupation tax, measured by three percent of gross retail sales. The
statute specified that the occupation tax was not to affect the vendor's
duty to collect or the consumer's liability to pay the retail sales tax.
The occupation tax was to be borne by the vendor. The amount of
the occupation tax was to be calculated, however, by subtracting from
three percent of total sales the amount of tax paid under the retail
sales act. In effect, therefore, retailers had to pay the occupation tax
97. In accord with the Walgreen case, see Obert v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 492,
59 N.E.2d 931 (1945).
98. 144 Ohio St. 471, 59 N.E.2d 924 (1945).
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only if three percent of their total sales was in excess of the amount
collected from purchasers for the retail sales tax. The vendor thus
asserted that the state's assessment against him for the retaiers oc-
cupation tax, measured by three percent of his gross sales, was
discriminatory, in that he received no deduction from the occupation
tax since he had collected no sales tax that he could deduct. The
court upheld his contention, reasoning that to require him to pay the
occupation tax would discriminate against him in favor of those
vendors who could deduct the sales tax collected from their customers.
Those vendors who collected a sales tax could use it to offset or even
cancel their liability for the occupation tax; the vendor of articles
under nine cents, who collected no sales tax, obviously could not so
reduce his liability. The court construed the occupation tax as de-
signed primarily to insure the collection of the retail sales tax, and
decided that since plaintiff-vendor owed no retail sales tax, his
liability was not further increased by the occupation tax. To hold
otherwise, the court said, would violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The equal protection feature of the decision seems open to some
question, however, since every vendor of' articles in the same tax
bracket as plaintiff received the same kind of tax treatment.99
3. The Vendor's Duty to Verify Customer's Purchase as Being Tax
Exempt
In the ordinary sales tax statute or municipal ordinance, a sale for
resale is not taxable. Where such is the situation, there will arise
questions concerning the vendor's duty to determine whether a
particular sale is tax exempt as a sale for resale. Although there is
a paucity of cases on this particular aspect of the collection of sales
taxes, Merriwether v. State'00 furnishes an example of a rather harsh
result for vendors in determining whether a purchase is for resale.
The Alabama statute, typical of the statutes of many states, pur-
ported to tax retail sales, not sales at wholesale. The plaintiff, a re-
tailer and wholesaler of automobile parts, filed a bill in equity to cancel
an assessment for state sales taxes. The contested assessment had
been imposed on plaintiff's sales of automobile parts to retailers
thereof, which the retailers did not resell, but used instead to re-
condition used automobiles, also sold by them. This would not have
been an exempt transaction under the statute. The plaintiff-vendor
was held liable for the assessed sales taxes on these articles which
had not been resold, even though the purchasers had represented to
the plaintiff that these articles were to be resold. The court-found
that the complaining vendor had not used sufficient dilkeice to as-
99. See Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legilatian, 24 VA: L. REV. 229,
388 (1938).
100. 252 Ala. 590, 42 So. 2d 465, 11 A.L.R.2d 918 (1949).
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certain whether the articles were within the tax exempt category
of articles to be resold. The court relied on Cody v. State Tax Com-
mission,1 1 an earlier Alabama case holding the vendor liable under
a similar fact situation. The court quoted extensively from the
Cody case that the vendor "is bound to find out the general nature
of the business conducted by [the customer] in respect to resales....
Responsibility for what is finally done with the merchandise... can-
not be visited upon the [vendor]. But he must exercise diligence to
know the course of business of his customer...." 102
An analogous case dealing with the vendor's duty to verify a
purchase as being for resale is Steubenville White Truck Sales &
Service, Inc. v. Peck.03 In that case the plaintiff vendor sought a
sales tax refund, which it claimed was erroneously collected on the
sale of eight trucks. The Ohio statute exempted from the tax ar-
ticles used "directly in the production of tangible personal property
for sale by... mining,"'10 4 and the trucks involved were used for this
tax exempt purpose. However, the Ohio statutes also required the
vendor to obtain a certificate from the vendee if the sales tax did
not apply to a given sale; and further provided that if no certificate
was obtained, the tax should apply. Since the plaintiff had not
obtained a certificate prior to the questioned sale, he was held liable
for the tax, even though the articles involved in the sale were, in
fact, used for a purpose which rendered them immune from the sales
tax. Therefore, the plaintiff's contention that the tax had been erron-
eously collected from him was without merit.
Although both cases indicate that the vendor's responsibility is
great, the latter case seems to represent the more certain and re-
liable method of describing and enforcing a vendor's responsibility
to verify a purchase as being for resale. A sufficiently clear standard
of conduct is expressly set forth in the Ohio statute involved in the
Peck case, as to what action the vendor must take to determine
whether a transaction is a taxable sale, The Alabama method of
handling the matter, as evidenced in the Merriwether case, not
only is not trustworthy, but it can be unreasonably harsh, for there is
no fixed standard by which the vendor can know when he has dis-
charged his responsibility. Also, it was there evident that the vendor
reasonably believed the sales of automobile parts were "wholesale
sales,"'0 5 and therefore not taxable. The vendor, as tax collector,
101. 235 Ala. 47, 177 So. 146 (1937).
102. Id., 177 So. at 148. This case also decided that a sale of automobile parts
to be used in the reconditioning of used cars was a taxable sale. This reasoning
is seemingly based on the fact that the Alabama Sales Tax Act exempts the
sales of used automobiles from the tax.
103. 162 Ohio St. 251, 122 N.E.2d 790 (1954).
104. Oxio REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01 (E) (2) (Baldwin 1953).
105. ALA. CODE ANN. Tit. 51, § 752(i) (1940), included in wholesale sales
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is treated as the agent of the state, and no more should be required
of him than that he act reasonably within the scope of his agency.
It would seem fairer to the vendor, therefore, for the state to pre-
scribe in a statute a reliable guide as to the vendor's duties and re-
sponsibilities, rather than to have them judicially determined on the
vague standard of reasonable diligence.
4. Personal Liability of Officers of Corporate Vendor for the Sales Tax
To hold a corporate officer personally liable for corporate obliga-
tions is the exception rather than the rule. However, a question
as to the personal liability of officers of a corporate vendor may arise
in connection with the insolvency of the corporation, particularly
where statutory liability for corporate obligations is imposed on
corporate officials. Such a problem was before the court in City of
New York v. Bernstein,0 6 where the city sought to hold the presi-
dent of a defunct corporation personally liable for sales taxes due
from the corporation for sales made in the regular course of business
while the defendant was president. The city based its claim on its
local ordinances, authorized by state enabling statutes,107 which pro-
vided for the personal liability for taxes of a corporate vendor's offi-
cers.108 At first the trial court held that the enabling statute did not
authorize the city to hold officers of a corporate vendor personally
liable "without regard to negligence, wrongdoing, or personal profit."
The court felt that a contrary holding would be inconsistant with the
theory of corporate regulation theretofore followed in New York.
At the second trial the plaintiff city's motion for judgment was
granted. The court there said that the first opinion seemed to rest
on intent, but that it was "quite clear ... that the enabling act con-
ferred upon the city all the power and authority to legislate in
this field that are within the competence of the state."' 09
The second holding apparently assumes that the tax ordinances of
New York City make the officer of a corporate vendor a virtual in-
surer to the city for the tax liabilities of his corporation. It indicates
that since the legislature of New York gave the city a plenary
authority to effectuate its own tax legislation, the city was free to
make the officers of a corporate vendor personally liable for corpo-
the sale of tangible personal property to a compounder which enters into and
becomes a component part of the product which he compounds for sale.
106. 193 Misc. 224, 84 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
107. "[A]ny city of the state having a population of one million.., or more
... is . . . authorized to adopt and amend local laws imposing in any such
city any tax.., which the legislature has or would have power and authority
to impose... and make provision for the collection thereof .... " N.Y. Laws
c. 444 (1938) as cited in 84 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
108. "[O]fficers of a corporate vendor shall be personally liable for the tax
collected or required to be collected by such corporation under this title . . .
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21 (1938) as cited in 84 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
109. 90 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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rate taxes without regard to the lack of any breach of trust or other
wrongful conduct on their part. This result seems to be harsh, but
not unique.110 . It makes the officer of a pc.rporation liable for taxes
without fault; and therefore is at variance with the generally recog-
nized theory that corporate officers are liable only for negligence
or malfeasance."'
5. Effect of the Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations is an important consideration for both the
taxpayer and the taxing authority, as both may have occasion to
invoke it as a defense. When a taxpayer seeks to recover a tax erron-
eously paid, the state may resist the claim as barred by the statute of
limitations. On the other hand, the taxpayer may resist the collec-
tion of unpaid taxes on the ground that the claim is barred by the
statute of limitations."
2
A. Use of the Statute of Limitations by the Taxpayer. The statute
of limitations in tax matters, by its own terms, often starts to run
upon the filing of a tax return by the vendor. In suits by the state
to recover assessed taxes, the problem may thus arise as to what
action by the taxpayer will constitute the filing of a tax return.
An excellent treatment of this problem in the field of sales taxation
is presented in People v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc."3 There the
defendant taxpayer had filed a consolidated return for his sales and
use taxes, on one form, furnished by the state. The taxpayer left blank
the spaces on the use tax side of the form. When the taxpayer inter-
posed the statute of limitations as a defense to the state's suit to re-
cover the use tax, the state took the position that, since the taxpayer
had left the spaces blank, he had not filed a tax return sufficient to
start the statute running. The court held, however, that the de-
fendant had filed a valid return, and that the statute had run. Three
factors were deemed important by the court in reaching its decision:
(1) the taxing state officials had long adhered to the practice of treat-
ing such a return as valid; (2) in the federal courts, blanks are usually
considered a positive representation of nothing to report;1 4 and (3)
meticulous accuracy is not required in order to start the statute of
110. States occasionally impose personal liability on both corporate officers
and stockholders. See, e.g., TENw. CODE ANN. § 48-111 (1955), which makes
directors of a corporation personally liable for corporate debts when the
amount of capital specified in the certificate of incorporation has not been
paid in before the corporation starts doing business; and § 48-710 which makes
stockholders personally liable for money due laborers, servants, etc., if the
corporation becomes insolvent.
111. See BALLANTmE, CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 63-65 (1946).
112. Statutes of limitations will not run against the state, however, unless
authorized by statute. 34 Am. JuR., Limitations of .4ctions § 393 (1941).
113. 34 Cal. 2d 649, 213 P.2d 697 (1950).




limitations running, as long as there is a good faith effort to comply
ivith 'the law.
In other cases involving the question of whether a conh Oidated
return constitutes a valid ieturn for tvto taxes, a guiding and primary
consideration is the nature of the taxes involved. If the taxes supple-
ment and complement each other, such as sales and use taxes, one
return may satisfy both.115 If they are distinctly separate taxes,
however, for different purposes, then normally a separate return will
be required for each.116
B. Use of Statute of Limitations by Taxing Authority as Bar to a
Refund. When the taxpayer seeks to recover a tax as erroneously paid,
there again will arise the problem of when the statute of limitations
starts to run against the taxpayer's claim for refund. Since the prop-
erty tax is much older than the sales tax, many of the doctrines con-
cerning the statute of limitations developed in the property tax field
and were carried over into the field of sales taxation. One such doc-
trine is that the statute of limitations will not start to run on a
suit for a refund when taxes have been paid or assessed under
mutual mistake, until the mistake is discovered or should have been
discovered.117 The theory of this doctrine is technically that the
statute of limitations applies to cases of mutual mistake, but the
running of the statute is suspended until the cause of action is known,
or should have been known by the taxpayer.118
An instance of the application of this doctrine appears in Phoenix
Amusement Co. v. Glander,"19 in which a taxpayer sought to recover
sales taxes paid by mistake. The plaintiff taxpayer in that case
was a vendor, who claimed he had erroneously paid sales taxes on
articles he had sold at less than nine cents. The Ohio Supreme
Court had invalidated the sales tax on certain articles below nine
cents, on May 9, 194 5.10 A statute required suits for the recovery of
sales taxes erroneously paid to be instituted "ninety days from the
date it is ascertained that the assessment is erroneous." Taxpayer had
learned of the decision invalidating the tax in September, 1945, and
had brought suit within ninety days of that date. This was not
within ninety days of the prior decision invalidating the tax,. however.
In allowing taxpayer to recover, the court held that the statute of
limitations had not run. Reasoning that the earlier decision did not
charge the taxpayer with notice of the invalidity of the sales .tax
115. But see Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, , A4 Utah
1, 196 P.2d 976 (1948).
116. See Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944);
Hewitt v. Bates, 297 N.Y. 239, 78 N.E.2d 593 (1948).
117. Board of County Comm'rs v. Doherty, 114 Colo. 594, 168 P.2d 556 (1946).
118. 34 AM. Jui., Limitations of Actions § 100 (1941).
119. 148 Ohio St. 592, 76 N.E.2d 605 (1947).
120. Winslow-Spacarb, Inc. v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 471, 59 N.E.2d 924 (1945).
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as applied to his sales, the court was of the opinion that the statute of
limitations did not start to run until the taxpayer actually learned
of the Olecision. In its opinion the court expressed the idea that
statutes of limitations should be construed liberally in favor of
the taxpayer, with the aim of trying to reduce his ever increasing
tax burden.
Although a taxpayer's claim for a refund of taxes erroneously col-
lected may be barred by the statute of limitations, still the tax-
payer may obtain relief by way of the equitable right of recoupment.
This right of recoupment is allowed, however, only if the state re-
opens the question of the amount owed by the taxpayer under the
assessment. The taxpayer in National Cash Register Co. v. Joseph
121
was allowed this right of recoupment, even though his claim for a
refund of sales taxes had not been filed within the time required
by statute. When the taxing city reopened the matter of taxpayer's
sales tax liability and assessed a tax, the taxpayer was entitled by
way of recoupment to set off a claim for taxes of the same type
erroneously paid, but a refund of which was otherwise barred by
the statute of limitations.
Some courts, however, favor the taxing authority instead of the
taxpayer under certain circumstances. It has thus been declared that
the statute of limitations should be construed liberally in favor of
the taxing authorities if the purpose of the statute is to expedite
the collection of taxes;122 and that, since there was no recovery of
taxes, once paid, at common law, the statute of limitations should be
strictly construed against the taxpayer as an unyielding condition to
his right of tax refund conferred by statute.12 3
6. Illegal Sales Taxes
A. Disposition of Money Collected for Illegal Sales Taxes. In the
event that a sales tax is declared invalid, the question may arise
whether the vendor is entitled to a refund from the taxing authority
of such taxes erroneously collected from the consumer and paid to
the state. If the vendor remains in possession of the tax collected from
the consumer, the similar question will arise whether the vendor
must pay the tax to the state. If the incidence of the invalid tax
is deemed to have been on the vendor, he is normally entitled to re-
covery of the taxes paid.124 There is a conflict of authority on these
questions where the court thinks the incidence of the tax is on the
purchaser.1' When the tax falls upon the purchaser, the majority
121. 299 N.Y. 200, 86 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
122. Collector of Revenue v. Rundell, 72 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1953).
123. Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832 (1952) (dealing with the
recovery of use taxes paid under a statute later declared unconstitutional).
124. Annot., 119 A.L.R. 542 (1939).
125. Id. at 543.
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of courts hold that the vendor may not recover from the state an in-
valid tax, previously paid.12 6 The principal reason for the denial
of recovery seems to be that the tax is not out of the vendor's
pocket, and therefore no one but the purchaser is entitled to a
refund.
Analogous to the cases upholding this view is Cook v. Sears-Roebuck
& Co.,127 which involved the Arkansas Gross Receipts Tax. This tax
was measured by two percent of retailers' sales in Arkansas, and the
retailer was required to collect this tax from the purchaser. Sears
had collected the tax on purchases made by Arkansas residents
through mail orders to out of state stores. Sears refused to pay this
tax to the state, and the tax commissioner promptly assessed Sears
for the tax. Sears then brought suit to cancel this assessment, claiming
that their mail order transactions were not taxable in Arkansas, and
that Sears had the right to keep the tax collected. The court never
reached the question of the validity of the tax. It disposed of the case
by holding that regardless of the validity of the tax, Sears had no right
to withhold from the state tax money collected from consumers. The
court concluded, in essence, that Sears could not contest the assessment
since the consumer was the actual taxpayer, and that to allow Sears
(the tax collector) to retain the money would result in unjust enrich-
ment to Sears.
Manifestly material to the court's decision was the fact that Sears
had neither the means nor intention of returning the tax to the tax-
payers. This same question appears decisive in other cases of the
same general nature; that is, whether or not the taxpaying purchaser
will ultimately recover the tax from the vendor appears to control the
vendor's right to recover or withhold the illegal tax from the state.
Only where there is every likelihood that the purchaser will be reim-
bursed do the courts depart from the general rule.
1 8
B. Personal Liability of the Tax Collector for Illegal Taxes Collected.
Taxes are often collected which are later found to be illegal, either
in themselves, or with regard to a particular taxpayer. The question
may then arise whether the official tax collector of the state or muni-
cipality is personally liable to the taxpayer for these illegal taxes
which he has collected. The problem is by no means limited to the
field of sales taxation, but may occur whenever the state tax collection
official comes into possession of any type of illegal taxes.
Normally the tax collector is not personally liable to the taxpayer if
the money has been turned over to the proper official of the state or
126. E.g., Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 278 N.Y. 293, 16 N.E.2d 288 (1938).
127. 212 Ark. 308, 206 S.W.2d 20 (1947).
128. See Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cls. 594, 9 F. Supp.
608, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 600 (1935); Benzoline Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger,
353 Ill. 600, 187 N.E. 657 (1933).
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municipal treasury, at least in the absence of protest from the tax-
payer at the time of payment. There is authority, however, upholding
the view that the tax collector may be personally liable for such
illegal taxes, even though he has paid the money into the treasury, if
the taxes were paid under protest.129 The tax collector has also been
held personally liable for such taxes, paid without protest, if the
money collected has not been subsequently placed in the treasury of
the taxing authority.130
A very thorough treatment of the question is rendered by the court's
opinion in Oakley Country Club v. Long."3' In that case the plaintiff-
vendor sought to hold the tax commissioner personally liable for
illegal meal taxes previously collected and paid into the state treasury.
Plaintiff there went against the commissioner personally, for against
the state his recovery was barred by the statute of limitations. The
defendant tax collector was exonerated from any personal liability
for the taxes, since he had committed no trespass, no seizure of prop-
erty, and caused no loss to the plaintiff which could not have been
recovered by an earlier action. The court's decision was thus based on
the tax collector's good faith performance of his duty, and the need for
the courts to protect him as he carries out this duty.
This is certainly the logical view, for it protects the fiscal interests
of the state as well as the official. The tax official could hardly function
-if he were required to perform under the threat of personal liability
for the possible injurious results of his every act. This is essentially the
reason which has long been used to buttress the assertion that an
official is not personally liable for the injurious results of purely min-
isterial acts. 32
129. See cases collected in Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 383 (1950).
130. Ibid.
131. 325 Mass. 109, 89 N.E.2d 260, 14 A.L.R.2d 377 (1949).
132. See 43 Am. JuR., Public Officers § 273 (1942).
